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6 CHARLES A. JONES, University of Massachusetts, Boston
7 DAVID L. LEVY, University of Massachusetts, Boston
8 Business has become a key part of the fabric of glo-
9 bal environmental governance, considered here as
10 the network which orders and regulates economic
11 activity and its impacts. We argue that businesses
12 generally are willing to undertake limited measures
13 consistent with a fragmented and weak policy
14 regime. Further, the actions of businesses act to cre-
15 ate, shape and preserve that compromised regime.
16 We examine three types of indicators of business
17 responses in North America: ratings by external
18 organizations, commitments regarding emissions,
19 and joint political action. We find business response
20 to be highly ambiguous, with energetic efforts
21 yielding few results.
22  2007 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
23 Keywords: Business strategy, Climate change, Go-
24 vernance, Carbon trading
25
26 Business has become a key part of the fabric of global
27 environmental governance (Levy, 2005). In their role
28 as investors, polluters, innovators, experts, manufac-
29 turers, lobbyists, and employers, corporations are
30 central players in environmental issues. The recogni-
31 tion by governments and NGOs that large firms are
32 not just polluters, but also possess the organizational,
33 technological, and financial resources to address
34 environmental problems, has stimulated consider-
35 ation of ways to harness and direct these resources
36 toward desirable goals. This acknowledgement of
37 corporate potential has occurred, not entirely coinci-
38 dentally, in a period of growing concern at a ‘gover-
39 nance deficit’ at the international level (Haas, 2004;
40 Newell and Levy, 2006; Slaughter, 2004).
41During the 1990s, much of the energy of North
42American business, particularly in sectors related to
43fossil fuels, was directed toward preventing an inter-
44national regime to impose caps on emissions of
45greenhouse gasses (GHGs). Indeed, industry groups
46such as the Global Climate Coalition and the Climate
47Council played a major role in preventing the United
48States from joining the Kyoto Protocol (Levy and
49Egan, 2003). More recently, many businesses have
50adopted a more constructive stance that acknowl-
51edges the reality of climate change and its responsi-
52bility for addressing the issue (Margolick and
53Russell, 2004). Increasingly, climate change is framed
54as an opportunity rather than a burden. A recent
55report from Ceres, a coalition of investors, firms,
56and environmental organizations, typifies the emerg-
57ing optimistic view:
58Companies at the vanguard no longer question how much
59it will cost to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, but how
60much money they can make doing it. Financial markets
61are starting to reward companies that are moving ahead
62on climate change, while those lagging behind are being
63assigned more risk. . . Shareholders and financial analysts
64will increasingly assign value to companies that prepare
65for and capitalize on business opportunities posed by cli-
66mate change (Cogan, 2006, : 1).
67This new approach is reflected in high-profile corpo-
68rate initiatives, such as ‘Beyond Petroleum’ from BP
69and ‘Ecoimagination’ from GE, which indicate that
70business is taking climate change seriously and antic-
71ipates some profitable opportunities. Simulta-
72neously, investors are increasingly alert to the
73financial risks of neglecting climate change as a stra-
74tegic issue. Sectors, such as agriculture, insurance,
75tourism, and real estate, face potential risks from
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76 the physical impacts of climate change, such as rising
77 sea levels and more frequent and intense storms. Fos-
78 sil-fuel related sectors are recognizing the inevitabil-
79 ity of carbon constraints, with significant impacts on
80 markets and costs. The Carbon Disclosure Project,
81 representing investors with more than $31 trillion
82 in assets, collects annual data from large multina-
83 tional corporations about their climate-related risks
84 (Lash and Wellington, 2007). Groups such as the
85 Investor Network on Climate Risk and the Climate
86 Group have played an important role recently in
87 highlighting the risks and opportunities facing vari-
88 ous sectors and encourage companies to assess and
89 manage these risks rather than ignore them (The Cli-
90 mate Group, 2005). A more proactive stance is likely
91 to provide companies with some protection against
92 litigation and damage to their reputation and litiga-
93 tion (Wellington and Sauer, 2005), as well as more
94 influence in shaping the detailed mechanisms of cli-
95 mate governance systems, such as allocation and
96 trading of carbon credits.
97 Meanwhile, local government and voluntary initia-
98 tives have emerged in response to the perceived lack
99 of guidance from national and international authori-
100 ties. In the United States and Canada, individual
101 states and new regional associations are formulating
102 policies in areas usually reserved for Federal action.
103 Recent agreements include the Regional Greenhouse
104 Gas Initiative (RGGI) covering nine Northeastern
105 and Mid-Atlantic States, and the Western Regional
106 Climate Action Initiative, signed by five Western
107 governors; both are centered on emission-trading
108 mechanisms for achieving reductions in greenhouse
109 gas (GHG) emissions. The prospect of mandatory
110 cap-and-trade systems is stimulating a reconsidera-
111 tion of corporate climate strategies. Business journals
112 and consultants proffer advice on carbon manage-
113 ment systems that entail, among other activities,
114 assessing risks, conducting emissions inventories,
115 setting targets, and assigning responsibilities (Hoff-
116 man, 2006).
117 These business initiatives represent real and signifi-
118 cant organizational changes and financial invest-
119 ments on the part of firms. Yet, the contrast between
120 this beehive of corporate activity and the relentless
121 upward trend in emissions presents something of a
122 paradox. Global carbon emissions in 2005 were 28%
123 higher than in 1990, and show no sign of slowing
124 (EIA, 2005; Wynn, 2006). United States emissions
125 were estimated to be 17% higher in 2005 than 1990
126 (EIA, 2006), while even many who are parties to
127 Kyoto, including Canada, are on a trajectory to miss
128 their Kyoto targets (UNFCCC, 2005). The disconnect
129 between the growing wave of business action and
130 these disappointing results raises some important
131 concerns. Even more puzzling is the resurgence of
132 corporate political activity in the United States
133 against climate policy initiatives, particularly those
134 emerging at the state level. This renewed opposition
135 to regulation is occurring in the same sectors, and
136even companies, that are embracing a range of car-
137bon-related initiatives and strategies.
138To explore this apparent paradox, we examine the
139political economy of the emerging global governance
140regime for GHG emissions. Global governance here
141refers to: 142
143the multiple channels through which economic activity and
144its impacts are ordered and regulated. It implies rule crea-
145tion, institution building, monitoring and enforcement. But
146it also implies a soft infrastructure of norms, and expecta-
147tions in processes that engage the participation of a broad
148range of stakeholders (Newell and Levy, 2006, p. 149).
149This conception of governance, which has become
150prominent in international relations, displaces gov-
151ernment from its traditional, sovereign role in estab-
152lishing and securing order ( Q1Rosenau, 1992). Instead,
153governance is viewed as a more diffuse form of
154authority and control operating through a network
155of actors at multiple levels. Within this system, states
156act as economic agents concerned about their ‘com-
157petitiveness’ (Palan et al., 1996), while firms are
158important political actors with significant policy
159influence. Bargaining over regime structures and
160processes engages actors in a complex set of strategic
161maneuvers in the economic, discursive, and political
162spheres (Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000; Prakash and
163Hart, 1999). Markets and the private decisions of
164firms are themselves part of the fabric of governance,
165as the day-to-day production, research and market-
166ing practices of large MNCs are decisive in shaping
167environmental impacts.
168In this paper we argue that the business community
169has played an important role in shaping the system
170of global GHG governance, and is generally willing
171to undertake measures consistent with a fragmented
172and weak policy regime, while at the same time tak-
173ing political action to create, shape and preserve that
174compromised regime. To describe the action busi-
175nesses take in regards to GHG governance, this
176paper examines the history and current nature of cor-
177porate responses to climate change In particular, we
178look at three indicators of the nature of corporate
179response: reports by outside organizations that docu-
180ment corporate responses and achievements; com-
181mitments to action undertaken by firms regarding
182emissions; and membership of firms in associations
183or alliances which take collective political action.
184We try to explain the paradox between the energetic
185efforts of firms and the lack of meaningful results by
186considering the multiple dimensions of a firm’s
187response. The position of firms is not merely for or
188against action on climate change, nor even along a
189continuum between those two extremes. Rather, a
190firms response to climate change occurs in many
191dimensions, including political, technological, orga-
192nizational, financial, and public relations compo-
193nents. The prospect for a relatively weak carbon
194regime, the considerable uncertainty associated with
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195 markets and technology, and complex nature of pos-
196 sible responses all contribute to firms’ responses
197 being ambiguous on many dimensions. Firms are
198 subsequently placing greater emphasis on manage-
199 ment processes, policy influence, and market image
200 than on major investments in low-emission technolo-
201 gies; on emissions trading infrastructure over emis-
202 sions reductions. The ambiguous response creates
203 and legitimizes a vast, bureaucratic, complex GHG
204 system, but one that does not actually require much
205 in the way of emissions reductions.
206 This paper proceeds in four sections, beginning with
207 the history of business response to climate change.
208 We then examine three types indicators of business
209 response: ratings by external organizations, commit-
210 ments regarding emissions, and joint political action.
211 In the discussion and implications section, we look at
212 the prospects a governance regime firms are both
213 responding to and creating. We conclude by placing
214 ambiguous action and the resulting governance
215 regime in historical context.
216 History of Business Response to Climate
217 Change
218 Despite the considerable attention given to potential
219 economic opportunities, the primary issue facing
220 many sectors remains the ‘regulatory risk’ of higher
221 costs for fuels and other inputs, and lower demand
222 for energy-intense products (Wellington and Sauer,
223 2005). Measures to control the emissions of GHGs
224 most directly threaten sectors that produce and
225 depend on fossil fuels, including coal, oil, autos,
226 power generation, and airlines. Other energy intense
227 sectors include cement, paper, agriculture, and alu-
228 minum. Companies also face considerable ‘competi-
229 tive risk’, as changes in prices, technologies, and
230 demand patterns disrupt sectors and entire supply
231 chains. Investments in research and development
232 are highly risky, as low-emission technologies, such
233 as those for renewable energy, frequently require
234 radically new capabilities that threaten to undermine
235 the position of existing companies and open the
236 industries to new entrants (Anderson and Tushman,
237 1990; Christensen, 1997).
238 These risks are not restricted to any particular region,
239 as many of the larger companies involved in these sec-
240 tors are multinational corporations (MNCs) with
241 operations and sales in multiple countries. Moreover,
242 MNCs anticipated that GHG regulation, following the
243 precedent of the 1987 Montreal Protocol for the con-
244 trol of ozone depleting substances, would be subject
245 to a strong global governance regime encompassing
246 most industrialized countries. It is therefore not sur-
247 prising that, beginning in the early 1990s, a wide range
248 of sectors responded aggressively to the prospect of
249 regulation of GHG emissions. U.S.- based companies
250were particularly active in challenging climate sci-
251ence, pointing to the potentially high economic costs
252of greenhouse gas controls, and lobbying government
253at various levels. Businesses from across the range of
254affected sectors formed a strong issue-specific organi-
255zations, such as the GCC and the Climate Council, to
256coordinate lobbying and public relations strategies
257(Gelbspan, 1997; Leggett, 2000; Levy and Egan,
2582003). Though these organizations were open to inter-
259national members and were active at the international
260negotiations to forge a formal GHG regime, they were
261dominated by North American companies and
262focused much of their efforts on the U.S. administra-
263tion. Meanwhile, U.S. energy and auto companies
264invested little in new technologies that could deliver
265short to medium term emission reductions(Levy,
2662005).
267European industry was far less aggressive in respond-
268ing to the issue, and displayed a greater readiness to
269invest in technologies, such as wind power and diesel
270cars, that would produce modest but relatively quick
271GHG emission reductions. These divergent strategies
272defy simple explanation, particularly in the oil indus-
273try, where companies on both sides of the Atlantic are
274large, integrated multinationals with similar global
275profiles and strategic capabilities (Rowlands, 2000).
276Studies of the oil and automobile industries have
277pointed to the institutional environment of these firms
278as important determinants of their strategic responses
279(Levy and Kolk, 2002; Levy and Rothenberg, 2002; van
280de Wateringen, 2005). Corporate strategies are driven
281by perceptions of economic interest that are mediated
282by the different cultural, political, and competitive
283landscapes in the United States and Europe. Senior
284managers of European companies tended to believe
285that climate change was a serious problem and that
286regulation of emissions was inevitable, but were more
287optimistic about the prospects for new technologies.
288American companies, by contrast, tended to be more
289skeptical concerning the science, more pessimistic
290regarding the market potential of new technologies,
291and more confident of their political capacity to block
292regulation. Moreover, several large American compa-
293nies had lost substantial amounts of money in invest-
294ments in renewable energy and electric vehicles in the
2951970s, and the painful lessons of that earlier era had
296become institutionalized in the companies.
297By 2000, a convergent trend could be discerned as
298key firms on both sides of the Atlantic moved toward
299a more accommodating position that acknowledged
300the role of GHGs in climate change, and the need
301for some action by governments and companies. In
302the oil and automobile industries, companies were
303beginning to invest substantial amounts in low-emis-
304sion technologies, and were engaging a variety of
305voluntary schemes to inventory, curtail, and trade
306carbon emissions. No obvious dramatic scientific,
307technological, or regulatory developments can
308account for these changes, but Levy (2005) has
309pointed to a number of factors. Most significantly,
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310 MNCs are located in global industries with cognitive,
311 normative, and regulatory pressures inducing some
312 measure of convergence in their perceptions of the
313 climate issue and of their interests (Scott and Meyer,
314 1994). On the economic level, competitive pressures
315 and interdependence have compelled companies to
316 respond to each other’s moves (Levy, 2005). For
317 example, Toyota’s commercial launch of the Prius,
318 a hybrid electric-small gasoline engine car, in the Jap-
319 anese market in 1998, took the industry somewhat by
320 surprise. Most American executives were initially
321 dismissive of the prospects for the car in the United
322 States, based upon GM’s experience with electric
323 vehicles. Nevertheless, the American auto companies
324 were nervous that they might fall behind a competi-
325 tor and introduced a number of hybrid vehicles by
326 2006. Similarly, Ford quickly followed Daimler-Benz
327 in investing in fuel cell technology. In the oil indus-
328 try, even Exxon appears to be softening its stance
329 (Mooney, 2005) regarding climate science, while
330 continuing to oppose mandatory emission controls.
331 The shift in the position of American industry can
332 also be linked to changing competitive dynamics,
333 strategic miscalculations, and the evolution of new
334 organizations supportive of a proactive industry role.
335 Efforts by the Global Climate Coalition and other
336 industry groups to challenge the science sometimes
337 produced a backlash from environmental groups
338 that damaged the fossil fuel industry’s credibility.
339 Environmental groups in Europe and the United
340 States issued a number of reports that documented
341 industry support for some climate skeptics, and
342 accused business of using its money and power to
343 distort the scientific debate (Corporate Europe
344 Observatory, 1997; Gelbspan, 1997; Hamilton, 1998).
345 The growth of new organizations committed to a cli-
346 mate compromise further undermined the GCC’s
347 claim to be the voice of industry on climate. The
348 Pew Center on Global Climate Change, formed in
349 April 1998, provides not only a channel of policy
350 influence for member companies, but also a vehicle
351 for legitimizing the new position.
352 Perhaps the most significant change in the corporate
353 landscape has been the diffusion and increasing legit-
354 imacy of the ‘‘win-win’’ discourse articulating the con-
355 sonance of environmental and business interests.
356 Groups such as the Pew Center actively promote this
357 position; indeed, the win-win paradigm is a key dis-
358 cursive foundation for a broad coalition of actors sup-
359 porting the emerging climate regime. A number of
360 environmentally oriented business associations, such
361 as the Business Council for Sustainable Energy, and
362 the World Business Council for Sustainable Develop-
363 ment, have adopted this perspective. Influential envi-
364 ronmental NGOs in the US, especially the World
365 Resources Institute and Environmental Defense
366 (Dudek, 1996) have initiated partnerships with busi-
367 ness to pursue profitable opportunities for emission
368 reductions. Governmental agencies find win-win rhet-
369 oric attractive for reducing conflict in policy making.
370The apparent reconciliation of viable economic strat-
371egies with the environmental case for action on GHG
372emissions makes this ‘win-win’ language of ‘‘ecolog-
373ical modernization’’ very attractive (Hajer, 1995).
374Ecological modernization puts its faith in the techno-
375logical, organizational, and financial resources of the
376private sector, voluntary partnerships between gov-
377ernment agencies and business, flexible market-
378based measures, and the application of environmen-
379tal management techniques (Casten, 1998; Hart, 1997;
380Schmidheiny, 1992). This optimistic stance has been
381buttressed by claims of significant cost savings, such
382as BP’s announcement in January 2003 that its suc-
383cess in reducing emissions by 10% (relative to 1990)
384had also generated $600 million in cost savings.
385Wal-Mart’s CEO recently stated that reducing green-
386house gases would ‘‘save money for our customers,
387make us a more efficient business, and help position
388us to compete effectively in a carbon-constrained
389world’’ (Lash and Wellington, 2007: 96). These initia-
390tives generally entail substantial public relations and
391advertising efforts to rebrand the companies as
392green, particularly around climate change, combined
393with substantial investments in research and devel-
394opment for low-emission technologies and products.
395An Empirical Assessment of Current
396Business Responses
397Corporate action on climate change appears to be
398spreading rapidly and growing in intensity. The
399Pew Center and the Climate Group, two organiza-
400tions dedicated to promoting business action on cli-
401mate change, have documented positive steps taken
402by numerous companies as well as the consequent
403financial and environmental benefits (Margolick
404and Russell, 2004; The Climate Group, 2005). Much
405of the corporate activity on climate change is stimu-
406lated by the perception of long-term market opportu-
407nities in new high-margin, low-emission products
408and technologies, as well as cost savings from lower
409energy use (Begg et al., 2005; Margolick and Russell,
4102004; Reinhardt, 2000; Romm, 1999). The develop-
411ment of markets for trading carbon credits presents
412a further stimulus.
413Despite this growing tide of corporate activity, no
414meaningful progress is being made concerning glo-
415bal GHG emissions, and pockets of strong corporate
416political opposition remain. It would be easy to con-
417clude from observing contemporary patterns of pro-
418duction, consumption, and power generation that we
419are largely conducting ‘business as usual’, with only
420marginal changes in a few niche markets. An exam-
421ination of this apparent paradox requires a more
422detailed consideration of various dimensions of
423business response strategies. Firms pursue multiple
424strategies that include political, technological, orga-
425nizational, financial, and public relations compo-
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426 nents. Uncertainty regarding the regulatory, techno-
427 logical, and market environment has led to consider-
428 able diversity in responses. Here we focus on three
429 indicators of corporate response to climate change.
430 The first, and most detailed, is an analysis of reports
431 by outside organizations that document corporate
432 responses and achievements, and in some cases rate
433 them with scores. Second, we consider various com-
434 mitments to action undertaken by firms regarding
435 emissions trading. These commitments are generally
436 expressed through participation in associations or
437 alliances in which members commit to individual
438 action. Third, we note business membership in asso-
439 ciations or alliances which take collective political
440 action, some in opposition to mandatory emission
441 controls and some in support of various forms of
442 action. Our methodology does not encompass a com-
443 prehensive survey or statistical analysis of all these
444 various business initiatives and responses, but rather
445 is intended to convey a representative snapshot of
446 the current state of business responses.
447 Reports on Business Responses
448 Four reports by outside groups are analyzed here: by
449 the environmental group Ceres (Cogan, 2006), The
450 Climate Group (2005), the Pew Center on Global Cli-
451 mate Change’s Business Environmental Leadership
452 Council (BELC) (Pew, 2006), and a survey of Cana-
453 dian GHG emitters conducted by Deloitte (2006).
454 The Climate Group is based in London while the
455 other organizations are US-based, though they all
456 have international activities and offices. The reports
457 have different criteria for inclusion and evaluation,
458 but overlap in coverage helps to provide a reasonable
459 indicator of corporate responses. Cogan Cogan (2006)
460 profiled 100 of the largest firms in ten carbon-intense
461 industries from energy, industrial, and transportation
462 sectors. All firms have significant US operations but
463 are headquartered in various countries, except for
464 the electric power industry, which includes US firms
465 only. Cogan assessed corporate governance on cli-
466 mate change based on board oversight, management
467 execution, public disclosure, emissions accounting,
468 and strategic planning. The companies were scored
469 with a 100 point checklist, with mean 48.5.
470 The Climate Group (2005) describes the achieve-
471 ments of 74 companies that have made measurable
472 progress on GHG emissions or other climate-related
473 action, and have benefited financially from doing
474 so. The data are derived mostly from the companies
475 themselves, and inclusion is based on cooperation.
476 The Pew Center’s BELC is a membership organiza-
477 tion. Membership requires a commitment to support-
478 ing climate change science and the responsibility of
479 the business community to take action. Their website
480 (Pew, 2006) lists company profiles, goals and
481 achievements. Joining the Pew Center is a response
482 strategy that was originally an action in opposition
483 to the anti-Kyoto Global Climate Coalition.
484The Ceres rankings point to the relatively poor per-
485formance of US-based companies. Note that the
486emphasis here is on management and reporting
487rather than emissions. The ‘top ten’ list (Table 1)
488includes four companies from North America, five
489from Europe, and one from Japan. North American
490firms are somewhat under-represented among the
491best performers, but all the bottom twelve companies
492are from the United States (Table 2).
493Ceres also found significant differences between
494industries. In general, chemicals, electric power,
495and automotive firms have the highest scores; air
496transport, food, coal, and oil the lowest; and indus-
497trial equipment, metals, and forest products in the
498middle. The differences, however, between firms
499within industries are much greater than the differ-
500ences between industries – the oil industry contains
501both the highest and lowest scores. This suggests that
502the existence of significant space for discretionary
503managerial action despite competitive and other
504pressures to conform.
505In the oil industry, four European companies (BP,
506Royal Dutch Shell, Statoil, and Total) all rank well
507above their North American counterparts in climate
508governance; BP, Total, and Shell have also docu-
509mented real reductions in carbon emissions (The Cli-
510mate Group, 2005); BP and Shell are members of the
511BELC (Pew, 2006). In contrast, among US oil compa-
Table 1 Top Ten Firms in Corporate Governance,
Rated by Ceres
BP Oil and Gas UK 90
DuPont Chemicals US 85
Royal Dutch Shell Oil and Gas Netherlands 79
Alcan Metals Canada 77
Alcoa Metals US 74
AEP Electric Power US 73
Cinergy Electric Power US 73
Statoil Oil and Gas Norway 72
Bayer Chemicals Germany 71
Nippon Steel Metals Japan 67
Source: (Cogan, 2006).
Table 2 Bottom Twelve Firms in Corporate Gover-
nance, Rated by Ceres
UAL Airline US 3
Williams Oil and Gas US 3
ConAgra Food US 4
Bunge Food US 5
Foundation Coal US 5
Southwest Airline US 6
Murphy Oil and Gas US 6
Phelps Dodge Metals US 6
Arch Coal US 8
AMR Airline US 9
PepsiCo Food US 9
El Paso Oil and Gas US 9
Source: (Cogan, 2006).
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512 nies, only Chevron ranks above average on the Ceres
513 report, only Sonoco is a member of the Pew group,
514 and no US oil firm appears in the Climate Group
515 study. Similarly, the London-based coal and minerals
516 company Rio Tinto scores above average on Ceres
517 and is a member of the BELC, while no US coal pro-
518 ducer has any positive indicators.
519 The metals and mining industry clusters into three
520 groups, but not purely along home country lines.
521 The aluminum industry is dominated by North
522 American firms (International Aluminium Institute,
523 2006). Alcan in Canada and Alcoa in the United
524 States both rate highly in climate leadership (Cogan,
525 2006), participate in the Business Environmental
526 Leadership Council, and have documented large
527 reductions in GHG emissions below 1990 levels
528 (The Climate Group, 2005). Three overseas steel
529 firms, Nippon of Japan, BHP Billington in Australia,
530 and Anglo American in the UK have above average
531 Ceres scores; while the US steel industry plus Mittal
532 Steel of the Netherlands have very low Ceres scores.
533 The good performance of aluminum manufacturers
534 can be explained, in part, by the high energy inten-
535 sity of the traditional process, which presents more
536 opportunities for reducing GHG emissions and for
537 cost savings.
538 The automotive industry also groups into three clus-
539 ters, largely on the basis of nationality. Japan-based
540 Toyota and Honda rate well, according to Ceres,
541 and have large emission reductions documented by
542 the Climate Group; US-based Ford and General
543 Motors are above average according to Ceres and
544 GM has modest achievements in the Climate Group
545 report; the German manufacturers Daimler, Volks-
546 wagen, and BMW all have below average Ceres
547 scores. In contrast with these indicators, it is note-
548 worthy that the European Union has much more
549 stringent fuel efficiency standards than either the
550 United States or Canada, and European manufactur-
551 ers as a group use advanced diesel technology and
552 lighter cars to achieve substantial efficiency improve-
553 ments (An and Sauer, 2004; Levy and Kolk, 2002).
554 The forest product industry, which has a large pres-
555 ence in North America, has been attributed with
556 widely varying indicators. There may be significant
557 opportunities in the sector for reducing power con-
558 sumption, for biomass power and co-generation,
559 and in management of carbon sinks inherent within
560 forests (Cogan, 2006). Indeed, paper company
561 Norske Canada has some of the most dramatic
562 achievements documented, a 60% reduction in CO2
563 from 1990 to 2004 (The Climate Group, 2005). While
564 US-based International Paper and Montreal’s Abitibi
565 lead in the Ceres ratings, it is lower ranked Weyerha-
566 user and Georgia-Pacific that are able to document
567 progress according to BELC (Pew, 2006).
568 Deloitte’s (2006) survey of 80 large Canadian GHG
569 emitters, primarily in the oil and gas, manufacturing,
570and power generation sectors, highlights the gap
571between corporate attention and action. Despite the
572focus on Canada, the results are likely to be typical
573of North America as a whole. Though 80% of firms
574ranked GHG emissions management as an issue of
575moderate to critical importance, half of the compa-
576nies still do not include emission management in
577their overall risk management strategy. The survey
578found that 91% of respondents claimed to have the
579management capability to complete a GHG emis-
580sions inventory, and 84% had actually completed
581an emissions inventory. Nevertheless, only 46% said
582they had the capability to execute the purchase or
583sale of emission credits and only 40% had established
584internal emissions targets and schedules.
585The most striking feature of business responses to cli-
586mate change, as reflected in these reports, is their
587inconsistency, ambiguity, heterogeneity, and limited
588scope. The heterogeneity in response reflects not only
589the degree to which a firm is acting, but also which of
590many possible actions it takes. The persistence of dif-
591ferences between firms in otherwise homogenous
592industries is one indicator of a tentative response.
593The large differences in the way the same firms are
594viewed by different outside evaluators suggest a
595degree of ambiguity as well as the difficulty in mea-
596surement and comparative assessment. For example,
597Japanese auto manufacturer Nissan has a corporate
598governance score below the German manufacturers
599– the lowest rated automaker by Ceres. Yet it has
600documented GHG emissions reductions on par with
601highly ranked Toyota and Honda (The Climate
602Group, 2005). Among industrial equipment manu-
603facturers, large American and European firms (Swiss
604ABB, GE and UTC in the US) are noted for their cor-
605porate governance (Cogan, 2006; Pew, 2006), but
606poorly ranked Caterpillar has documented greater
607GHG reductions than UTC, while ABB and GE do
608not appear in the Climate Group Report.
609Commitments on Carbon Trading
610Several private emissions trading schemes exist
611wherein firms agree to limit their emissions and
612trade GHG credits. Reasons for this might include a
613hope to prevent the imposition of mandatory restric-
614tions, the shaping of future trading systems, estab-
615lishment of baselines, or hope for a competitive
616advantage by gaining trading experience. The Chi-
617cago Climate Exchange, for example, is a private ini-
618tiative by companies who voluntarily commit to limit
619GHG emissions and engage in trading to meet those
620commitments. The Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX)
621opened in October 2003 with twenty-two members,
622including American Electric Power and Ford. CCX
623(www.chicagoclimatex.com) now has about 60 full
624members who trade emissions, and many more that
625provide or purchase offsets. Full members have large
626GHG emissions and commit to reducing emissions
627from North American operations by one percent a
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628 year for four years, and further reductions thereafter.
629 Associate members have smaller emissions but wish
630 to offset them, while Participating members are those
631 that sell certified offsets.
632 The Federal government, in line with the current
633 administration’s stated preference for voluntary
634 measures, sponsors some of these programs that
635 entail commitments to action. The joint EPA/Depart-
636 ment of Energy Climate Wise program (DOE, 1996)
637 has disappeared, replaced by the EPA’s Climate
638 Leaders. Climate Leaders (www.epa.gov/climate-
639 leaders) enlists companies to set goals for emission
640 reductions. One advantage listed is for companies
641 to ‘‘strategically position themselves as climate
642 change policy continues to unfold.’’ The Department
643 of Energy’s Climate VISION (Voluntary Innovative
644 Sector Initiatives: Opportunities Now) (www.cli-
645 matevision.gov) enlists trade groups to reduce their
646 members’ GHG intensity. However, voluntary action
647 does not ensure that companies meet their existing
648 commitments. A Government Accountability Office
649 report (Stephenson, 2006) found that participants in
650 the EPA’s and the Department of Energy’s voluntary
651 emission reduction programs have not always met
652 the conditions of those programs, and did not bear
653 any consequences. This is not a problem only for vol-
654 untary programs, as many parties to the Kyoto
655 accord are on a trajectory to miss their targets
656 (UNFCCC, 2005).
657 As cap-and-trade systems become the basis for exist-
658 ing and proposed climate policies, some firms are
659 anticipating that preparation for emissions trading
660 could establish a strategic advantage, particularly
661 for those with relatively efficient operations, opportu-
662 nities for innovation, or simply a well-developed
663 trading capability. Many large firms have called for
664 a national cap-and-trade system to end the uncer-
665 tainty posed by the emergence of multiple state and
666 regional systems (Donnelly, 2007; USCAP, 2007). An
667 advantage of CCX over the DOE and EPA programs
668 is that the mechanisms are likely to be similar to
669 future trading systems. The Climate Group and Pew
670 Center reports do not tabulate climate trading,
671 although make note of some firms who have adopted
672 voluntary restrictions (Pew, 2006; The Climate Group,
673 2004). The Ceres report (Cogan, 2006) includes mea-
674 sures related to emissions trading in two of its scoring
675 categories: up to 24 points of the 100 are for ‘Emis-
676 sions Accounting’, a vital precursors to trading; and
677 participation in emissions trading is one of three
678 activities evaluated within the 32 point ‘Emissions
679 Management and Strategic Opportunities’ score.
680 Adopting emissions trading is cited as a way to ‘‘gain
681 experience and maximize credits’’ (p.3) ahead of
682 future requirements.
683 However, participation in trading schemes is uneven
684 for even the supposed strategic leaders. The Euro-
685 pean Trading Scheme (ETS) mandates emissions
686 accounting and trading for firms operating in Europe
687in particular sectors, but with various exclusions for
688smaller facilities and power plants. Firms with North
689American operations could choose to join the Chi-
690cago Climate Exchange. Of the top 13 firms rated in
691Strategic Opportunities by Ceres (Table 3), only
692Dupont, Bayer, and AEP are members of CCX
693(www.chicagoclimatex.com). Abitibi and Interna-
694tional Paper, who have Strategy scores at the top of
695their industry if not overall, are members of CCX.
696Although Honda is the highest rated auto manufac-
697turer by Ceres, Ford, with scores only average for
698automotive industry, is a current and founding
699member of CCX. Moreover, while voluntary trading
700is seen as both a way to reduce emissions and to gain
701experience in a carbon-constrained environment, the
702low trading prices ($3–4 during 2007) indicate that
703the limits are neither particularly constraining nor
704do they provide much of a signal to encourage emis-
705sion reductions.
706It is notable that cap-and-trade based systems have
707emerged as the centerpiece of policies designed to
708constrain carbon emissions. Emissions trading was
709originally advocated by the United States in interna-
710tional negotiations as a flexible mechanism that
711would encourage firms and countries to pursue eco-
712nomically efficient opportunities to reduce their
713emissions (Aulisi et al., 2005). The European Union
714and some environmental organizations had
715expressed early concerns that highly flexible trading
716systems would raise problems regarding conditional-
717ity and verification, enabling companies and coun-
718tries to evade their responsibilities through creative
719accounting and buying carbon credits of dubious ori-
720gin (Haar and Haar, 2006). By 2006, however, the
721European Trading System accounted for 62% of the
722volume and over 80% of the value of total carbon
723trading worldwide, estimated by market analyst
724Point Carbon at €22.5 billion for 1.6 billion tonnes
725of carbon dioxide equivalent. This global market is
726expanding very rapidly, more than doubling since
7272005 (Point Carbon, 2007).
Table 3 Top Thirteen Firms in Strategies, Rated by
Ceres (out of 32)
BP Oil and Gas UK 29
Dupont Chemicals US 28
Royal Dutch Shell Oil and Gas Netherlands 27
ALCOA Metals US 24
Nippon Steel Metals Japan 23
Bayer Chemicals Germany 23
Statoil Oil and Gas Norway 22
AEP Electric Power US 21
ALCAN Metals Canada 21
Honda Automotive Japan 20
GE Industrial Equip US 20
ABB Industrial Equip Switzerland 20
Calpine Electric Power US 20
Source: (Cogan, 2006).
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728 Business Political Action
729 Firms also express their response to climate change
730 by participating in collective political action. Busi-
731 ness associations such as the International Chamber
732 of Commerce have made clear that the acknowledg-
733 ment of business responsibility for emissions and
734 their willingness to dedicate resources to addressing
735 the issue entitle business to a significant role in policy
736 development (ICC, 1995). Joining or funding alli-
737 ances, industry associations, coalitions and the like
738 allow businesses to engage in collective action, some-
739 times outside of their normal area of expertise. The
740 trajectory of the Global Climate Coalition (GCC) is
741 an illustrative example (Levy and Egan, 2003).
742 Formed to be the industry voice on climate policy,
743 firms began leaving GCC in the late 1990’s as its posi-
744 tions became unpopular, and, as some would argue,
745 its mission had been fulfilled: the United States with-
746 drew from Kyoto in 2001. ExxonMobil remained the
747 last major supporter until GCC deactivated in 2002.
748 Nevertheless, several other organizations, primarily
749 US-based business associations and conservative
750 think tanks, continue to act in opposition to climate
751 change regulation at all levels. These include the
752 Coalition for Affordable and Reliable Energy
753 (www.careenergy.com), the Cooler Heads Coalition
754 (www.globalwarming.org), the American Council
755 for Capital Formation (www.accf.org) and the Center
756 for Energy and Economic Development (www.ceed-
757 net.org). The model legislation by the American Leg-
758 islative Exchange Council (Greenblatt, 2003) and
759 ballot initiatives throughout the West attempt to limit
760 the ability of States to enact environmental policy.
761 These organizations typically mount a multi-
762 pronged attack: casting doubt on climate change sci-
763 ence, highlighting costs of emission limits, opposing
764 government limits in general and international
765 agreements in particular. The Competitive Enterprise
766 Institute (CEI) advertisements in 2006 attacking the
767 concept of carbon dioxide as a pollutant (Zabarenko,
768 2006) parallel a 2004 talk by the head of Canada’s
769 largest oil company (Morgan, 2004). The Cooler
770 Heads Coalition resumed its activities in February
771 of 2007 (www.globalwarming.org) as a project of
772 CEI, but some prior supporters, including ExxonMo-
773 bil, have ceased funding. In February 2007, shortly
774 after the release of the Fourth Assessment Report of
775 the IPCC, the American Enterprise Institute (AEI)
776 offered a $10,000 incentive to scientists and econo-
777 mists who write papers challenging the IPCC find-
778 ings. The AEI continues to receive significant
779 funding from ExxonMobil and many other compa-
780 nies in the energy sector.
781 Other organizations occupy more proactive positions
782 on climate change. Organizations such as the Pew
783 Center and the Business Council for Sustainable
784 Energy, which have been around since the mid-
785 1990s, constitute a counter-movement to the AEI,
786 CEI and other oppositional industry organizations.
787More recently, the United States Climate Action Part-
788nership (USCAP) was launched with considerable
789publicity in early 2007 as a coalition of major busi-
790nesses and environmental organizations advocating
791mandatory cap and trade (www.us-cap.org); they
792support eventual international agreement but want
793the United States to take immediate action. They call
794for relatively modest reductions, but with mandatory
795limits, broad coverage, and accountability of offsets
796(USCAP, 2007). USCAP appears to be attempting to
797shape the emerging emissions regime in anticipation
798of future regulations; it is calling for features of ben-
799efit to member businesses, such as credit for pre-reg-
800ulation action and carbon price limits. In March 2007,
801USCAP’s position was joined by 65 investor groups
802and financial companies who called for Federal legis-
803lation and significant GHG reductions by 2050 (Don-
804nelly, 2007). The firms involved expressed a desire
805for greater certainty in emissions regulation; they
806may also prefer uniform Federal action to a patch-
807work of State and regional rules.
808Yet there is not a simple alignment of those in favor
809versus those opposed to action on climate change;
810indeed, some companies can simultaneously be
811members of multiple organizations and initiatives
812with apparently conflicting agendas. One indicator
813of being in favor of action is participation in volun-
814tary schemes. The U.S. Department of Energy’s Cli-
815mate VISION (Voluntary Innovative Sector
816Initiatives: Opportunities Now) (www.climatevi-
817sion.gov) enlists trade groups to reduce their mem-
818bers’ GHG intensity. However, about half of the
819organizations participating in Climate VISION are
820also members of CARE (www.careenergy.org),
821which strongly supports coal power and opposes to
822any emissions caps. In these cases organizations are
823at the same time making a commitment to solve cli-
824mate change problem, advocating voluntary and
825market based solutions instead of mandatory ones,
826and questioning whether there is a climate change
827problem at all.
828Part of the recent upsurge in corporate political activ-
829ity comes in response to the development of pro-
830grams for mandatory emission trading at the State
831level in North America. Two multi-state agreements
832in particular illustrate the local policy trend. The
833Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) initially
834included seven States – Connecticut, Delaware,
835Maine, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York,
836and Vermont – which signed on to a model rule that
837would institute a cap-and-trade program covering
838CO2 emissions from power plants. Although they
839had recently abandoned RGGI, Massachusetts and
840Rhode Island announced their intention to rejoin in
841January 2007. Maryland, Pennsylvania, and the East-
842ern Canadian Provinces are observers in the RGGI
843process (www.rggi.org). On the West coast, the Wes-
844tern Regional Climate Action Initiative is an agree-
845ment between Governors of Arizona, California,
846New Mexico, Oregon and Washington to set a
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847 GHG emission target and develop a market based
848 system for meeting it. This is the latest action in
849 States that have been working individually and in
850 various combinations towards emissions trading sys-
851 tems (information and press release at www.pewcli-
852 mate.org). These regional cap-and-trade systems do
853 not impose severe restrictions and are designed to
854 limit the price of carbon credits and any increases
855 in power generation costs. RGGI, for example, will
856 become effective in 2009 and cap emissions in the
857 power sector at approximately current levels until
858 2015, after which the emissions cap will be incremen-
859 tally reduced by 2% a year. Although RGGI is ini-
860 tially targeted toward emissions from power
861 generation facilities, the program includes an offset
862 mechanism that would encourage companies in
863 other sectors to engage in product and process inno-
864 vations that reduce GHG emissions. While these
865 other sectors would not be constrained by a cap,
866 the potential offsets would offer benefits to non-
867 power emitters of CO2 as well as emitters of other
868 GHGs, such as HFCs, methane and sulfur hexafluo-
869 ride (SF6). Participants in these initiatives expect
870 them to become the prototypes for a national multi-
871 sector mandatory emissions trading scheme whose
872 caps could be ratcheted down as political opportuni-
873 ties arise.
874 More than half of US states are addressing climate
875 change in some manner; many are drafting climate
876 change action plans and enacting renewable portfolio
877 standards, which require a growing percentage of
878 generation to be from renewable sources (Rabe,
879 2006). In response to State actions, some business
880 organizations have mobilized to oppose local as well
881 as national and international regulation. The US auto
882 industry is vigorously contesting efforts by Califor-
883 nia and New York to exert direct regulatory control
884 over vehicular carbon emissions (Hakim, 2005). Var-
885 ious California business groups have been attempt-
886 ing to slow its moves towards regulating emissions
887 (Baker, 2006). Corporate lobbying has been impli-
888 cated in the (temporary) withdrawal by Massachu-
889 setts RGGI in early 2006 (VanDeveer and Selik,
890 2006). Another business oriented group, the Ameri-
891 can Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), has been
892 developing model legislation at the state level to
893 limit regulation of GHGs, and claims almost a third
894 of all legislators in the country as participants
895 (Greenblatt, 2003; Rabe, 2006).
896 While some US-based organizations oppose regula-
897 tion at all levels on libertarian principles, others act
898 more narrowly to preserve their economic interests.
899 The libertarian CEI opposes GHG limits, ethanol sub-
900 sidies, and clean coal subsidies (www.cei.org), while
901 the industry group CARE opposes GHG limits but
902 supports research funding for coal and ethanol
903 (www.careenergy.com). The Associated Industries
904 of Massachusetts (AIM) has opposed RGGI from its
905 inception, praised former Governor Romney for
906 abandoning the pact, and condemned Governor Pat-
907rick for rejoining it. AIM stated that it would be
908costly for Massachusetts to act ahead of Congress
909(www.aimnet.org).
910Discussion and Implications
911The indicators we examined show considerable ambi-
912guity in the responses of the business community
913towards climate change. Various external organiza-
914tions come to different conclusions when evaluating
915firms’ achievements. Broad patterns seen in the rat-
916ings with respect to industry and home country in
917some cases contradict other indications. Voluntary
918emission trading schemes seem to represent greater
919investment in trading infrastructure than in emis-
920sions reduction. And firm and industry political
921action through various associations are sometimes
922seem at odds with their other actions and statements.
923The review of corporate strategic responses to cli-
924mate change sheds some insight into the paradoxical
925coexistence of a beehive of corporate activity on cli-
926mate change yet with few tangible outcomes. Of
927course, it might simply be too early to evaluate the
928impact of corporate efforts; some investments in
929innovation are unlikely to yield short-term gains,
930and preparations for establishing the infrastructure
931for carbon trading are bound to take some time. Nev-
932ertheless, the results reported here suggest that busi-
933ness responses, especially in North America, are
934uneven and rather ineffective, at least in relation to
935the scale of action needed. Corporate responses tend
936to be directed toward organizational changes rather
937than emissions reductions per se. Here we argue that
938these corporate responses can be understood in the
939context of the emerging GHG regime. To the extent
940that a global regime can be said to exist, it is frag-
941mented, and carries very weak price signals, and out-
942side of Europe is still largely voluntary. The
943emerging GHG regime is simply not up to the task
944of a radical restructuring of energy and transporta-
945tion markets.
946Firms clearly pursue different response strategies
947with various degrees of vigor, depending on their
948exposure to climate risks, their sectoral location, their
949individual capabilities, and the idiosyncrasies of par-
950ticular business leaders. Some firms emphasize inno-
951vation for reducing emissions while others plan to
952rely more on carbon trading. A central problem is that
953many businesses plan to continue to grow their sales
954at a rate fast enough to offset any reduction in emis-
955sion intensity (per unit of output). Even the actions
956of many clear leaders in the business response to cli-
957mate change are limited and tentative. The operating
958GHG emission reductions achieved by BP and Shell
959are a tiny fraction of the emissions produced by the
960use of their products (The Climate Group, 2005).
961GE’s Ecomagination campaign amounts to 17 prod-
962ucts with sales of $10 billion within a diversified
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963 $150 billion revenue company, and R& D commit-
964 ments of about 10% of the $14 billion GE invests in
965 development (www.ge.com). The products other
966 than wind turbines mostly comprise incremental
967 improvements to efficiency and production processes
968 for existing products, as would be expected to occur
969 in normal technological development.
970 The emerging climate governance regime comprises
971 a patchwork of market-based approaches, energy
972 efficiency measures, voluntary corporate action, and
973 weak regional trading systems. The incentives and
974 sanctions in such a weak and fragmented regime
975 may simply be inadequate in the face of the growing
976 global economy and the risks of irreversible global
977 climatic change (Azar and Dowlatabadi, 1999). While
978 North American companies increasingly realize that
979 climate change is a long-term issue to which they will
980 need to develop market and technological responses,
981 in the short term they face only modest political and
982 economic incentives for strong action. The emerging
983 regime comprises a relatively loose system of inter-
984 national governance involving significant contesta-
985 tion as well as collaboration among states, firms,
986 non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and multi-
987 lateral institutions (Levy and Prakesh, 2003; Newell
988 and Levy, 2006). The reliance on voluntary measures,
989 particularly in the United States, reflects a wider
990 trend in environmental governance toward various
991 forms of industry self-regulation (Cashore et al.,
992 2004; Delmas and Terlaak, 2001; Potoski and Prak-
993 ash, 2005).
994 Ironically, it is largely the resistance of fossil fuel
995 dependent countries and industries to more stringent
996 regulation that has induced the fragmentation and
997 flexibility of the current governance system. While
998 these compromises have facilitated the evolution of
999 a politically viable governance system, they are also
1000 the fundamental source of the weakness of this sys-
1001 tem. The specific mechanisms and targets agreed
1002 by the parties to the Kyoto Protocol helped to bring
1003 reluctant countries on board and accommodate
1004 industry opposition. The main elements of the Proto-
1005 col include mandatory but modest emission targets,
1006 which are substantially weakened by broad and flex-
1007 ible mechanisms for implementation and weak
1008 enforcement (Grubb et al., 1999). The inclusion of car-
1009 bon sinks introduces considerable uncertainty and
1010 room for creative accounting, and the ability to buy
1011 carbon credits in international emission trading
1012 schemes enables countries of the former Soviet
1013 Union to sell large amounts of ‘‘hot air’’ credits.
1014 The Clean Development Mechanism and Joint Imple-
1015 mentation further reduce the adjustment burden.
1016 While the momentum of this fragmented multi-fac-
1017 eted regime is clearly gathering pace, there is not
1018 yet a firm regulatory or economic incentive for firms
1019 to adopt radical changes in their strategies. Recent
1020 trades on the Chicago Climate Exchange have been
1021 priced very cheaply, falling towards $3 per ton of
1022CO2, illustrating the weakness of a voluntary system.
1023The RGGI program in the Northeastern United States
1024will most likely include a ‘safety valve’ designed to
1025prevent the price of carbon credits exceeding $10 a
1026ton (VanDeveer and Selik, 2006), which is insufficient
1027to drive substantial innovation or efficiency mea-
1028sures (Fischer and Newell, 2003; Krause et al., 2002;
1029Neuhoff, 2005). The proposed trading mechanism
1030would also enable participants to purchase credits
1031from external sources, such as the Clean Develop-
1032ment Mechanism, generating concerns about the fun-
1033gibility and verification of emission reductions. In
1034Europe, carbon prices collapsed in 2007 to just about
1035$1.50 a tonne after too many permits were allocated
1036relative to industry demand. The current price for
10372008 contracts, the first year of a new trading period,
1038is around $15–20 per tonne.
1039Emissions trading systems are also beset by concerns
1040relating to high transaction costs and the additional-
1041ity of internationally traded credits (Michaelowa and
1042Jotzo, 2005). An investigation of projects to incinerate
1043HFC-23 in developing countries revealed that the
1044revenue stream from carbon credits actually encour-
1045aged the production of refrigeration units, which
1046generate significant emissions of GHGs in their man-
1047ufacture and operation. Moreover, credits are being
1048sold for several times the cost of generating them,
1049with lawyers and accountants taking a substantial
1050portion of the money (Bradsher, 2006). Overall, we
1051see a huge investment of corporate energy in prepar-
1052ing the organizational and accounting infrastructure
1053for emissions trading, but resulting carbon prices
1054that are too low to induce any fundamental market
1055changes.
1056In the absence of a significant price signal from car-
1057bon trading, the basic economic and political forces
1058that structure energy markets ensure the continued
1059growth of fossil fuels for the foreseeable future. In
1060the United States, the oil industry maintains suffi-
1061cient political influence to secure subsidies and
1062favorable tax treatment. The efforts of European oil
1063companies exemplify how climate strategies fre-
1064quently represent small niche markets that do not
1065significantly impinge on existing core activities.
1066Though BP and Shell have each committed to invest
1067more than $1 billion in renewable energy, and have
1068been particularly active in promoting their efforts
1069in the media, these new businesses are miniscule in
1070comparison with their core oil and gas operations,
1071which continue to grow (The Climate Group, 2005).
1072Oil MNCs on both sides of the Atlantic have con-
1073verged on the view that constraints on carbon emis-
1074sions are not likely to present a serious threat (Levy
1075and Rothenberg, 2002). Oil production is expected
1076to peak around 2020 to 2030, with a slow subsequent
1077decline; at higher prices, vast reserves of oil shale
1078and deeper ocean sources become viable. All the oil
1079companies are well diversified into natural gas, the
1080demand for which is booming, primarily for power
1081generation, while renewables are not expected to
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1082 pose a major threat before mid-century due to cost
1083 and infrastructure limitations. Oil is used primarily
1084 for transportation, with no commercially feasible
1085 substitutes on the horizon, and any improvements
1086 in fuel efficiency, for example, from hybrids or
1087 advanced diesel, are more than offset by growth in
1088 vehicle sales and miles traveled, particularly in
1089 developing countries. Air transportation is also
1090 growing rapidly, and in any event is not covered
1091 by Kyoto. Biofuels such as ethanol from corn can
1092 slowly be incorporated into existing infrastructure
1093 and business models, but will supplement rather
1094 than substitute for oil as a liquid fuel.
1095 Some substantial business opportunities clearly do
1096 exist. The rapid growth of markets for renewable
1097 and clean energy, and for energy efficiency, is one
1098 example. Global markets for wind, solar photovoltaic
1099 (PV), and fuel cell power are growing at an annual
1100 rate of approximately 20%, albeit from a tiny base,
1101 and are forecast to reach $115 billion by 2015, from
1102 a 2005 base of only $24 billion (Makower et al.,
1103 2006). Markets for associated electronics, materials,
1104 construction, and services will also experience rapid
1105 growth. The global market for energy efficiency
1106 products, currently estimated at $115 billion, is pro-
1107 jected to grow to over $150 billion by the end of this
1108 decade. These markets, however, present substantial
1109 market and technological risks, and many of the
1110 small firms active in these areas are currently in a
1111 precarious financial position. Moreover, the growing
1112 market for renewable energy is only slowing, rather
1113 than reversing, the growth of fossil fuel based gener-
1114 ation; indeed, in the United States, that has recently
1115 been a resurgence of planned investment in coal-
1116 fired generation. In other sectors, the incentives for
1117 action are even less clear. In the insurance industry,
1118 for example, despite rising insured losses that many
1119 attribute to climate change, major North American
1120 firms are reluctant to take action on the issue due
1121 to a tradition of conservatism, relying on the federal
1122 government for disaster relief, and the lack of clear
1123 financial benefits from action (Haufler, 2006).
1124 Conclusions
1125 Given the prospect of a flexible and fungible carbon
1126 regime with weak caps, high transaction costs and
1127 low, if unpredictable, carbon prices, it is perhaps
1128 unsurprising that companies are currently placing
1129 more emphasis on management processes, policy
1130 influence, and market image than on major invest-
1131 ments in risky low-emission technologies. Ahead of
1132 any mandatory caps, especially in advance of setting
1133 any baselines, investing in emissions trading infra-
1134 structure has a greater potential return than invest-
1135 ing in reducing emissions. Firms seem to be
1136 responding to a vast, bureaucratic, complex GHG
1137 system, but one that does not actually require much
1138 in the way of emissions reductions. Yet firms also
1139create and sustain this governance regime, both
1140through their political advocacy, and through the
1141legitimacy conferred by perceptions of success.
1142External reports rate firms highly for small positive
1143steps, reinforcing the ‘win-win’ discourse of ecologi-
1144cal modernization.
1145When the United States first agreed to a binding
1146international agreement in Geneva in July 1996, it
1147provided an explicit assurance that industry interests
1148would be integrated into the climate regime. Chief
1149negotiator Tim Wirth promised that the United States
1150would pursue ‘‘market-based solutions that are flex-
1151ible and cost-effective’’, and that ‘‘meeting this chal-
1152lenge requires that the genius of the private sector be
1153brought to bear on the challenge of developing the
1154technologies that are necessary to ensure our long
1155term environmental and economic prosperity’’
1156(Wirth, 1996). The emergent regime is sufficiently
1157weak and flexible that it does indeed accommodate
1158most business concerns about short-term disruption
1159to markets, and many firms appear willing to engage
1160in substantial organizational and technological
1161efforts to work toward a long-term carbon con-
1162strained future. In a sense, companies are hedging
1163their bets by investing in long-term alternatives
1164while acting to preserve the value of their technolog-
1165ical and market assets in the short to medium term.
1166Simultaneously, however, the locus of regulatory
1167activity is moving to the state level in the United
1168States, and when these policy initiatives threaten to
1169impose more immediate and stringent caps on emis-
1170sions and to create a model for national regulation,
1171business is reverting to its oppositional stance of
1172the 1990s.
1173By examining several indicators of business
1174response, we are able to discern the multiple dimen-
1175sions of strategy that firms pursue. The existence of
1176ambiguity even within indicators, such as profound
1177differences between different rating reports and par-
1178ticipation by firms in contradictory political associa-
1179tions, shows that these indicators do not separate
1180the dimensions of strategy completely. Future
1181research might be able to separate the dimensions
1182more carefully, to better discern changes in each
1183dimension as the responses to climate change evolve.
1184Yet the ambiguities overall show how limited and
1185tentative the emerging governance regime is.
1186Emissions trading represents the heart of a corporate
1187compromise with pressures to address climate
1188change, and it is the area in which we witness the
1189greatest amount of corporate activity. Emissions
1190trading represents the emerging consensus around
1191market-based, low-cost policy instruments. While
1192business and states are engaged in considerable orga-
1193nizational efforts to establish the infrastructure and
1194capabilities for trading systems, the incentives for a
1195major shift in resource allocation toward low-emis-
1196sion energy sources, products and technologies is
1197mitigated by political pressures for highly flexible
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1198 trading schemes in which carbon prices will remain
1199 low.
1200 Overall, we see a series of energetic efforts yielding
1201 ambiguous and tentative results. The implication is
1202 that we are not on a trajectory towards a genuine
1203 solution. Breaking the inertia of past practice is not
1204 sufficient. The global GHG regime appears to be
1205 institutionalizing within the middle ground, with
1206 marginal improvements on past practice but without
1207 reaching sustainability. A dramatic environmental
1208 ‘shock’, or an unlikely assertion of political leader-
1209 ship might well be required to provide the necessary
1210 impetus for change.
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